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1 INTRODUCTION 
In human reliability analysis it is always of major 
concern to identify and quantify performance shap-
ing factors (PSFs) correctly, since those may affect 
results of reliability assessments considerably. There 
are many different approaches to use PSFs in exist-
ing assessment methods. Note that in some of them, 
alternative names are used for the concept of PSFs, 
for example “performance influencing factors” 
(SHERPA method) or “error producing conditions” 
(HEART method). One reason for the variety in the 
use of PSFs is the fact that they often lack a suffi-
ciently detailed definition and a clear scope. Multi-
ple interdependencies between PSFs furthermore 
lead to difficulties in distinguishing between them 
and make PSFs hard to handle. This leaves room for 
misunderstanding and interpretation. 
 
In Boring et al. (2007) performance shaping factors 
are defined as “ …influences that enhance or de-
grade human performance and provide basis for con-
sidering potential influences on human performance 
and systematically considering them in quantifica-
tion of human error probabilities (HEPs)”. They are 
further categorized as internal and external with “in-
ternal PSFs—influences that the individual brings to 
the situation such as mood, fitness, stress level, etc.” 
and “external PSFs—influences in the situation or 
environment that affect the individual such as tem-
perature, noise, work practices, etc.“ It is also possi-
ble to classify PSFs in direct and indirect PSFs. Di-
rect PSFs are defined as that they “can be measured 
directly, whereby there is a one-to-one relationship 
between the magnitude of the PSF and that which is 
measured”. Indirect PSFs are described as that they 
“cannot be measured directly, whereby the magni-
tude of the PSF can only be determined 
multivariately or subjectively”. 
 
Even though the definitions do serve as a first guide-
line, their practical application in order to obtain a 
clear structure in the end is rather difficult. Further-
more it is necessary to understand exactly how PSFs 
influence human actions to get a vivid impression of 
this relationship. Only then PSFs can be easily ap-
plied in the railway context. It is desirable to define a 
hierarchical structure for PSFs to keep the interde-
pendencies at a minimum as otherwise an influence 
might get too much weight. 
 
In this paper, we will first give an overview about 
what PSFs are. We will discuss the aspects which 
make dealing with PSFs difficult. The experience 
gathered in the DFG-funded project SMSmod will 
be used to paint a clear picture of PSFs in railway 
incidents. In particular we identify a set of most fre-
quent PSFs that have an influence on the train driver.  
In this paper we will focus on the incident “signal 
passed at danger” (SPAD) as this incident was by far 
the one found most often in the database. Addition-
ally, as this hazard is very well researched e.g. in the 
UK, SPADs allow to compare the results with other 
work (e.g. Kyriakidis et al., 2012).  
The PSFs found in the incidents analyzed in 
SMSmod were identified using two different ap-
Influential Factors on Human Performance in Railways and their 
Interrelations  
T. Lindner & B. Milius   
Institute of Railway Systems Engineering and Traffic Safety 
Technische Universität Braunschweig, Germany 
 
D. Schwencke & K. Lemmer 
Institute of Transportation Systems, German Aerospace Center, Braunschweig, Germany 
 
 
 
 ABSTRACT: In this paper performance shaping factors (PSFs) that occurred most frequently in the analysis 
of signals passed at danger (SPADs) with the second generation method CAHR are discussed. In order to as-
sess the validity of the identified PSFs, we compare our results with the results obtained from an adapted 
Why-Because-Analysis of a subset of the same incidents. The relationship and dependencies between the fac-
tors are discussed in detail. We put the identified PSFs for SPADs in the context of an existing PSF taxono-
my, in the context of a simple model of the railway system and perform a clustering on them. In the last part 
of the paper we explain how future simulation studies can help to advance in the understanding of the identi-
fied PSFs and their relationships. 
 
proaches: One approach is the second generation 
human reliability assessment method CAHR, the 
other one is the accident analysis method “Why-
Because-Analysis” (WBA). These two methods were 
applied to incidents from the data base provided by 
the German railways. The most important PSFs, 
identified as results are presented in the following 
sections. Conclusions towards defining and structur-
ing PSFs in a systematic way are drawn. Finally, the 
possibility of a detailed assessment of the most in-
fluential PSFs in the context of the train driver is 
discussed.    
2 PERFORMANCE SHAPING FACTORS 
As described in the introduction, PSFs influence 
human behavior and human reliability. If PSFs are 
not taken into account when human reliability is as-
sessed, the results might significantly differ from re-
ality.  
Generally, PSFs are most often thought of as a nega-
tive influence on human behavior. This means, that 
they usually describe an influence which decreases   
the operator’s reliability. Nevertheless, depending on 
how a PSF is “set on the scale”, it may also have a 
beneficial effect on human reliability. Furthermore 
in general there is no simple relationship between 
the presence of the PSF and the increase or decrease 
of human reliability, e.g. for the PSF stress it is 
known that too much stress but also mental 
underload lead to a decrease in reliability.  
The difficulties arising from identifying PSFs and 
their inclusion in a human factors analysis are sum-
marized in the following section. 
 
Incident descriptions influencing results 
Depending on the degree of detail of a description of 
a given incident it can be very difficult to derive spe-
cific performance shaping factors. Usually, an inci-
dent description does not contain specific infor-
mation about the influencing factors leading to a 
hazardous event, but only a description of the actions 
/ mistakes of the persons analyzed as well as obvious 
(technical) information. Our experience from the 
project SMSmod has shown that only in some cases 
PSFs could be taken directly from incident descrip-
tion. Usually, such PSFs are irregularities in opera-
tions, daytime/nighttime or driver experience. Many 
other aspects leading to an incident can only be as-
sumed as they are not literally discussed in the de-
scription. The reason for this might be the shortcom-
ings of guidelines for incident descriptions as these 
set their focus on the results of the incidents, rather 
than on the underlying causes. Another reason might 
be that especially PSFs which are directly related to 
the human cannot be assessed easily because e.g. the 
human is not aware of them and will therefore not 
mention them in incident descriptions. To summa-
rize the above, deriving PSFs from incident descrip-
tions one may miss important PSFs which are not 
addressed directly in the descriptions. Methods are 
needed which help to identify PSFs in a systematic 
manner. 
 
Definition and overlap of different PSFs 
Different persons might define PSFs differently. 
Currently no generally accepted and well defined 
PSF taxonomy appears to exist. Furthermore, PSFs 
are often closely related which makes it difficult to 
distinguish one from another. A very good example 
for this is a PSF “irregularity in operation”. This PSF 
does probably also relate to PSFs like distraction, 
knowledge of rules or stress. Another example is the 
difficulty of distinguishing the general term “stress” 
from the more specific “workload”. In both exam-
ples a user of a given PSF taxonomy can choose any 
of the given terms and be correct, no matter which 
one he chooses. Such inconsistencies make it diffi-
cult to produce reliable results. Therefore, strict def-
initions which are generally applicable in railways 
are needed. This criticism is closely connected to the 
task of setting strict boundaries between different 
PSFs. Furthermore, it is necessary to set up a hierar-
chical structure which displays the dependencies of 
the PSFs on e.g. different levels of detail. 
 
Effects of PSFs 
The effect that a PSF has on a person cannot easily 
be calculated as it might vary widely depending on 
e.g. personal experiences and interdependencies with 
other PSFs occurring. Therefore for e.g. risk assess-
ments it is difficult to capture and quantify the effect 
a PSF has on a human as part of a system.  
To get a better understanding of the impact of certain 
PSFs, it is crucial to analyze as much data as possi-
ble to get qualitative and especially quantitative in-
formation about the impact a PSF can have. A con-
cept is needed to deal with a large variety of possible 
effects of PSFs on humans in analyses.  
3 ANALYZING PERFORMANCE SHAPING 
FACTORS WITH CAHR 
CAHR is the acronym for "Connectionism Assess-
ment of Human Reliability". With the database sys-
tem CAHR (Sträter 2000) it is possible to analyze 
operational disturbances caused by human actions. It 
is based on a generic knowledge base for the inci-
dent analysis that is extendable by the description of 
further incidents. The knowledge-base e.g. contains 
information about the system state.  
In contrast to past methods for incident analysis, the 
CAHR evaluation process is an analytical and not a 
classifying method. In the method, an incident is sys-
tematically broken down, analyzed, and described 
for the purpose of a qualitative error and cause de-
termination. The analysis method proceeds from 
general questions to substantive information that was 
observable during the incident via actions and it 
moves on to error indications and PSFs. Although 
the method employs existing taxonomies from litera-
ture for support during analysis, it is not tied to any 
fixed, predetermined descriptors. It is, in other 
words, an open procedure. The approach makes it 
possible to preserve the original information of the 
incidents. Besides, there is no compulsion to catego-
rize an incident in a certain classification scheme 
that might possibly not reproduce actually observed 
aspects correctly and that could thus lead to misin-
terpretations.  
The described general procedure of CAHR is also 
applicable for the determination of PSFs in CAHR.  
PSFs are derived from hazardous incident descrip-
tions and have to be manually chosen for each inci-
dent. There is no fixed taxonomy that has to be ap-
plied in CAHR.   
 
Within the work on the SMSmod project a large 
number of PSFs were identified. As some PSFs were 
only identified once in the course of 105 descriptions 
of SPADs, it does not seem sensible to take into ac-
count all PSFs that influence the train driver. We 
will therefore focus only on the PSFs that were iden-
tified most often in SPADs. These PSFs are given in 
Table 1, where all PSFs except comprehension have 
negative influence on the train driver’s reliability. 
(Note that the quantities do not add up to 105 be-
cause one incident may be influenced by more than 
one PSF.) 
 
Table 1. Most frequent PSFs identified in connection with 
SPADs using CAHR 
Performance Shaping Factor Quantity 
irregularities 52 
distraction 50 
comprehension (positive) 40 
visibility conditions 36 
fatigue 27 
job experience 27 
just culture 13 
signal location 10 
stress / strain 9 
signal design 7 
 
4  ANALYZING PERFORMANCE SHAPING 
FACTORS WITH WHY BECAUSE 
ANALYSES  
Why-Because Analysis (WBA) is a well established 
causal incident analysis method (Ladkin 2001). A 
top event is broken down step by step to a complete 
set of necessary causes for the top event; this way a 
why-because-graph is created. In order to ensure the-
se properties of the causes, in each step counterfac-
tual tests and a causal completeness test have to be 
carried out. Being a rather formal method, WBA 
guides the applicant to exhibit all causes of an inci-
dent, regardless whether they are attributed to an in-
dividual, an organization, a technical system or the 
environment. It avoids including speculative causes, 
meaning that each cause identified actually influ-
enced the outcome (the top event). It encourages to 
discuss the relations of causes in detail, to logically 
derive causes and to search for missing pieces of in-
formation. 
 
On the other hand, this also means that the applica-
tion of the method is rather conservative, as it is very 
dependent on the availability of facts about the inci-
dent, i.e. the analysis may be very limited if not all 
of the main contributing causes are known. Especial-
ly human actions (or omitted actions) can often not 
be further analyzed, since it is not always clear what 
lead the human to a particular decision. For the latter 
reason we attached PSFs to the causes identified in 
WBAs, where we used a structured list of PSFs 
(Schwencke, Talg & Lemmer 2012) created mainly 
through a literature survey within the SMSmod pro-
ject as a basis. The PSFs could either directly be en-
coded in the cause (e.g. if the WBA already found 
out that the weather conditions lead to a prolonged 
breaking distance which in turn was a cause for a 
SPAD) or refer to a fact associated with the cause 
which was known but could not be included in the 
WBA because of the formal restrictions (e.g. it may 
be known that it was dark outside when the train 
driver overlooked a sign, but this is not a complete 
set of causes). It can then be read off from the why-
because-graph which PSFs (assigned to root causes) 
influenced which human action (given as a cause in 
the graph). 
 
We investigated eight SPAD incidents for which 
there was sufficient information to conduct a WBA 
and assigned PSFs as described above. Table 2 
shows the performance shaping factors that were 
found most often. For the interpretation of the counts 
please note that 
• the PSFs of the whole incident were counted 
(in two cases the SPADs were followed by 
further errors); 
• a PSF was counted several times for one 
event in case it influenced several causes; 
• only PSFs that influenced the train driver 
were taken into account; and 
• it was distinguished between negative and 
positive influences (displayed in the two col-
umns). 
 
Table 2. Frequent performance shaping factors in connection 
with SPADs identified using WBAs 
Performance Shaping Factor Quantity (neg) 
Quantity 
(pos) 
night hour 7 0 
darkness 6 0 
irregularities 5 1 
communication 5 0 
trackside complexity 5 0 
attention 4 2 
distraction (by persons) 4 0 
feedback from technical system 3 2 
bad sight (weather / sun) 3 0 
signal design 2 0 
5 COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCE 
SHAPING FACTORS IDENTIFIED IN CAHR 
AND WITH WBA 
Comparing the approaches to determining the most 
important PSFs via CAHR and WBAs, it should first 
be stated that both methods were conducted using 
incidents from the same database. However, the 
number of incidents that were investigated signifi-
cantly differed between the two methods (eight 
WBAs for SPAD incidents and 105 SPAD incidents 
in CAHR which included the former). In contrast to 
the CAHR evaluation, for the assignment of PSFs in 
the WBAs a previously fixed taxonomy (Schwencke, 
Talg & Lemmer 2012) based on a literature study 
was used. Thus different sets of PSFs were assigned 
using two different incident analysis methods in or-
der to explore a wide range of PSFs and to obtain 
solid insights how they affect railway operation. 
In general, the WBA results from Table 2 confirm 
the CAHR-findings from Table 1: irregularities are a 
major influence in both cases as well as distraction, 
where the lower position in Table 2 reflects the fact 
that the entry is restricted to distraction by persons. 
The PSF “fatigue” was chosen in the CAHR ap-
proach whenever the incident took place at night, so 
this corresponds to the WBA-PSF “night hour”. The 
“visibility conditions” from Table 1 comprise the en-
tries “darkness” and “bad sight (weather / sun)” from 
Table 2. A smaller but still significant impact of the 
signal design is stated in both tables. 
 
There are also some differences in the PSFs obtained 
from the two approaches: the CAHR-PSFs “compre-
hension (positive)”, “job experience”, “just culture”, 
“signal location” and “stress” do not occur in Table 
2. Comprehension is the only positive PSF which 
was found to be significant for SPADs in CAHR; 
since the comprehension of the situation by the train 
driver may be related to different or even no percep-
tions, it may well be that it matches all of the posi-
tive occurrences of PSFs found in Table 2. A more 
detailed comparison of the positive CAHR- and 
WBA-PSFs cannot be given due to the different ap-
proaches (single positive PSFs in CAHR vs. poten-
tial positive influences of all WBA-PSFs). In the 
case of job experience, the difference between 
CAHR and WBA is due to a more fine-grained ap-
proach in case of the WBAs, where several related 
PSFs concerning the familiarity with different as-
pects of train and infrastructure were used. Just cul-
ture was not part of the PSF taxonomy used for the 
WBA analyses since there can hardly be found evi-
dence in the literature that this is an issue in railway 
incidents; it is however discussed as a factor related 
to reporting safety issues in the UK. Nevertheless, 
the incident reports suggest that it might have led 
train drivers to act in a way so that they would not be 
blamed for their mistakes, so it was included in the 
CAHR-PSFs. In the case of signal location the dif-
ference most likely is due to a different interpretation 
of the incident data from which an influence by the 
signal location can seldom be read off directly, but 
seems to be likely in some cases. This may also have 
contributed to the considerable score of the “track-
side complexity” WBA-PSF although there was a 
separate WBA-PSF which directly refers to the sig-
nal position. Stress, as it may originate from many 
different sources, was not chosen as a PSF itself in 
the WBA approach but can be inferred from other 
PSFs. 
 
There are also several WBA-PSFs (communication, 
trackside complexity, attention and feedback from 
technical system) which do not occur in the list of 
the most important CAHR-PSFs. In case of “com-
munication” and “feedback from technical system” 
these PSFs only occurred in a small number of cases 
so that they do not appear in Table 1. The trackside 
complexity score was partly explained above. Atten-
tion as a very dependent measure was not included 
in the CAHR PSFs. 
 
In conclusion, both approaches complement each 
other. Some major PSFs are confirmed by both ap-
proaches, others are found to be very influential only 
by one method which is either due to a different ab-
straction level of PSFs (one PSF in one method cor-
responding to many PSFs in the other method) or a 
different interpretation or assignment of the PSFs. 
Despite the relative small sample the WBAs added 
further insights to the CAHR results, e.g. empha-
sized the importance of communication in train driv-
ing. Working with a comprehensive list of PSFs as 
in the WBA approach which prevents leaving PSFs 
aside which cannot be read off from the incident re-
ports at first sight seems to be of advantage only for 
identifying less important PSFs and when a larger 
sample is inspected. As the reader may have noticed 
from the comparison of the different sets of PSFs, it 
is crucial to have precise definitions of the PSFs to 
be able to relate them properly. One step towards 
getting a clear picture of what a PSF means is dis-
cussed in the following chapter, where the PSFs dis-
cussed above are classified and grouped under dif-
ferent aspects. 
6 CLASSIFICATION OF PERFORMANCE 
SHAPING FACTORS 
PSF taxonomies are given – besides the ones in 
HRA methods – e.g. by Kyriakidis (2012), in the 
German standard VDI 4006 (1999) and by Hammerl 
(2011). The railway specific classification described 
by Hammerl distinguishes physical, personal and or-
ganizational PSFs. His focus was on minimizing 
mutual influences of his set of PSFs, i.e. to provide 
PSFs which are as independent as possible. Since 
dependencies seemed to be inevitable in case of the 
influence of some organizational factors (e.g. train-
ing) on some personal factors (e.g. expertise), he fur-
ther split up personal factors into individual factors 
and influenced factors and organizational factors in-
to basic and staff-related factors. Clustering our 
PSFs from Tables 1 and 2 according to his frame-
work results in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Clustering the identified PSFs with Hammerl’s classi-
fication 
Physical 
visibility conditions 
darkness 
bad sight 
trackside complexity 
feedback from technical system 
signal design, signal location 
Personal 
individual  
Personal 
influenced 
fatigue / night hour 
 job experience 
Organizational 
staff-related  
Organizational 
basic  
 
The personal factors communication, attention and 
stress do not match the influences listed by Hammerl 
(2011) under his categories, since they are dependent 
on many different factors. Irregularities and distrac-
tion do not fit well in his framework. Moreover, both 
of them may have many very different origins. 
 
The clustering in Table 3 suggest that SPADs are 
mainly influenced by factors from two groups. The 
large number of physical factors indicates that a 
more user-friendly design and alignment of technical 
elements of the railway system could improve the 
situation w.r.t. SPADs – even sight-related factors 
may be dealt with by changes in technical systems as 
replacing trackside elements by in-cabin displays. 
The personal factors which fit and those which do 
not fit in the classification of Table 3 emphasize that 
the relevant personal factors are influenceable and 
are dependent on many different aspects. Thus in or-
der to reduce the negative influence of those factors 
on SPADs a comparatively expensive holistic ap-
proach including the consideration of many further 
underlying personal and organizational factors needs 
to be taken.  
The fact that no organizational factors were found 
among the most important PSFs reflects that organi-
zational matters influence railway operation in an 
indirect way, but also that there seems to be no clos-
er look at and documentation of organizational caus-
es during incident investigations. 
 
Especially irregularities, distraction and stress, 
which were identified as some of the most frequent 
influencing factors by CAHR as well as by WBA 
analyses do not fit with the classification of 
Hammerl. This leads to the question, if it might be 
possible to classify the PSFs on the basis of their 
sources and dependencies. In the following sections 
we discuss two different approaches which may be 
of interest in order to get a deeper understanding of 
what are relevant issues for human reliability in 
railways and where these issues are located in the 
railway system. Firstly, based on the organizational 
structure of railway operation, a classification of 
PSFs according to the different parts of the railway 
system aiming at a straight forward application is 
given. Secondly, a clustering purely based on the 
CAHR and WBA evaluation results is performed. 
 
 
Classification of Performance Shaping Factors 
from the structure of railway operation 
The results of the evaluation of incident reports 
using CAHR and WBA has shown that very many 
different PSFs can be identified. It also shows that 
the question which PSFs are the “correct” ones re-
mains and also if all relevant PSFs are identified. 
Considering the high number of PSFs that can be 
found it is rather difficult to stay focused on the ones 
which might influence the safety of the railway sys-
tem most. Therefore, our approach focusses on PSFs 
which have a direct influence on the most basic 
function of the railway system that is providing a 
safe train ride.  
The railway system itself is complex, as a safe 
train ride is only possible when very different parts 
of the railway system and the environment are work-
ing together. Most basically, the railway system can 
be divided into the different subsystems of railway 
infrastructure and operation (e.g. signals, infrastruc-
ture elements and their operators) and the train driv-
er. The environment comprises e.g. landscape and 
weather. The simplified classification system view is 
shown in Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1. Different system parts working together 
 
A basic rule for allocating the following PSFs is 
that a PSF can only be assigned to the subsystem in 
which it can be directly influenced. Furthermore, the 
PSF is to have a direct influence on the train ride as 
such. These PSFs are called primary PSFs. One ex-
ample of a primary PSF is signal location. A signal 
location which makes it difficult to see the signal 
can be changed directly at the signal. Missing a sig-
nal or recognizing it too late has direct impact on the 
train ride. For most PSFs given in Table 1 such an 
allocation was carried out and is shown in Figure 2. 
 
The PSFs in the middle of Figure 2 (distraction 
and stress / strain) cannot be allocated to any subsys-
tem. Such influencing factors are called secondary 
PSFs. Rather than originating in a subsystem they 
describe the effect (primary) PSFs can have on the 
human. 
 
Figure 2. Classification of PSFs to the different subsystems 
 
Both PSFs - distraction and stress / strain - describe 
an effect of the primary PSFs on the human e.g. of 
seeing a signal aspect too late. Also, primary human 
PSFs can affect the human behavior via secondary 
PSFs. As an example, lack of job experience might 
lead to increased stress. 
Not all PSFs which were identified using CAHR 
or WBA classify as PSFs in our proposed structure. 
An example is age which is sometimes labeled as 
PSF as well. In our classification, age would be con-
sidered as a cause to several PSF e.g. fatigue or (bad) 
sight. Another example for aspects not included are 
most aspects related to the organization such as e.g. 
just culture or hierarchical order as these do not have 
a direct impact on safety. In the focus of the classifi-
cation is the identification of means which enable 
safe train rides. As such, only aspects which impact 
a train ride directly are called PSFs. When an analy-
sis shows that some aspects influence safety more 
than others, a detailed analysis of these PSFs will 
show the very different reasons for the bad impact of 
the factor. Such an analysis which will look at very 
different sources of information and give the user an 
idea how to influence the problematic PSF to reach a 
higher safety level. By following the proposed two 
step approach it allows the user to focus on aspects 
which are especially relevant in the given context. 
 
As a first conclusion of this we can postulate that 
by including secondary PSFs together with primary 
PSFs by which they are influenced in experiments or 
in the evaluation of incidents we will result in an 
overlay of negative influences on human behavior as 
the same effect, e.g. an irregularity (a primary PSF), 
is weighted stronger since it is also included in the 
(secondary) PSF stress. A division into primary and 
secondary PSFs may be a good possibility for han-
dling the problem of the dependencies between dif-
ferent factors. We will need to look at more exam-
ples to find out of the given structure of the railway 
system needs to be expanded. Also, we have to 
transfer all PSFs identified into our classification to 
get more experience with its application. 
 
Clustering of the Performance Shaping Factors 
from the CAHR and WBA results 
Apart from general scientific PSF taxonomies, it 
seemed scientifically interesting to provide a free 
topical clustering of the most important PSFs related 
to SPADs that we found, in order to obtain a high-
level view on the situation. We produced such a 
clustering without using a particular method like fac-
tor analysis or cluster analysis (Bortz 2005), but just 
by sorting the PSFs from Tables 1 and 2 into the 
structure of the PSF-list which was used for assign-
ing PSFs to WBAs. With this as a basic clustering, 
in a second step it was tried to form as few groups of 
PSFs as possible, where the PSFs in one group are 
still arguably related. This led us to consider the four 
critical groups of PSFs shown in Table 4. 
 
 
 
  
Table 4. Clustering the most important PSFs into groups 
No. Group Factors Comment 
1 
personal 
factors 
fatigue / night hour, 
communication, attention, 
job experience 
A wide range of activities can be thought of to improve the situation, from very 
basic (shape positive culture) to very specific (provide more operational and 
environmental information to the train driver). The underlying organizational 
and related personal factors must be considered and actions taken may affect any 
role, procedure or technical system. 
2 
unusual 
events 
irregularities, distraction, 
stress 
It seems that it is difficult for the train driver to handle disturbances. The 
reasons for this may be manifold (out of the loop-phenomenon due to 
automation, normally operation based on strict rules, missing information about 
context of own train ride). This highlights the importance of resilience 
engineering, i.e. to design the railway system more flexible in order to cope with 
unexpected events. This includes procedures, systems design and humans as 
well. 
3 bad 
visibility 
visibility conditions / bad 
sight (weather / sun) / 
darkness 
Not much of a surprise for a visual task like perceiving a red signal aspect. 
Many technical solutions can be thought of in order to mitigate the influence of 
the factors considerably, e.g. in-cabin displays. 
4 systems design 
trackside complexity, 
feedback from technical 
system, signal design, 
signal location 
This pertains to infrastructure and in-cabin systems. It exhibits potential for 
applying usability criteria, considering human factors and involving the user 
when designing railway systems. 
 
For all of the groups it is also important to raise 
the train driver’s awareness of these factors and to 
provide possible strategies to cope with them. 
In order to check whether the clustering has pro-
duced groups of particularly interrelated PSFs, from 
the CAHR data an analysis of the common occur-
rences of PSFs can be performed. 
7 SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
 
Assessing human reliability, it is necessary to take 
PSFs into account. The experience from the project 
SMSmod has shown that many influencing aspects 
can only be assumed as they are not discussed in in-
cident descriptions. There may also exist overlaps of 
different PSFs, so it is hardly possible to assign a 
factors to an incident without discussion. To mini-
mize these problems, one important step is to give 
strict definitions of each PSF. The complexity of 
calculating the effect of PSFs on a person requires 
not only as much evaluation data as possible, but al-
so clear concepts. 
We presented two different approaches (CAHR 
and WBA) to the identification of the most im-
portant performance shaping factors in relation with 
SPADs from incident data. The results of the WBAs 
mostly confirmed but also complemented the ones 
from the CAHR analysis. We found several ad-
vantages of the additional use of WBAs for the as-
signment of PSFs to incidents: the way in which the 
PSFs influence the incidents is explicit in the why-
because-graph, and a Why-Because Analysis filters 
the pieces of information about the incident which 
arguably caused it and helps to find out about miss-
ing pieces of such information. Thus the PSFs as-
signed should be less speculative. Disadvantages lie 
in the considerable effort to create a WBA and in 
that the formal restrictions of the method may rule 
out some incomplete but nevertheless interesting de-
tail information from the why-because-graph and 
thus also prevent the assignment of the PSFs related 
to this information. 
One PSF that is of particular interest in railway 
operation is “distraction”. Distraction was found to 
be one root cause in the majority of the SPAD’s that 
occurred in the past. In PSF research, the concept of 
“distraction” suffers a lack of definition and often 
covers different kinds of distractors that are qualita-
tively quite different from each other. Distraction 
can be external in nature, when something unex-
pected happens in the environment of the driver, but 
it can also be more internal, like distracting thoughts 
that impair attentional processes. Within the external 
origins of distraction, a further distinction should be 
made between distraction inside and outside the 
driver’s cab, as well as between distractors that are 
out of the driver’s control and deliberate self-
distraction (like answering a private phone call). 
Many more distinctions are imaginable, but a more 
systematical definition of the concept of distraction 
is mandatory and will lead to detailed research ques-
tions. 
Distraction as well as stress / strain and irregulari-
ties, as other examples of the most frequent factors, 
are not considered in the classification of Hammerl 
(2011) which aimed at providing a small set of rather 
independent PSFs. This together with the need for 
clearly defined and independent PSFs led to the de-
velopment of a classification of the identified most 
important SPAD-related PSFs according to the or-
ganizational structure of railway operation. In this 
approach, influencing factors are divided into prima-
ry and secondary PSFs. This kind of classification 
might help to differ between factors that result from 
properties of the system or human influences as well 
as factors that are influenced or rather caused by the 
appearance of other, superior (primary) PSFs. These 
results are helpful to understand how the most im-
portant PSFs act in the context of the railway system. 
Moreover, the assignment of PSFs to different parts 
of the railway system may facilitate the application 
of the results about important PSFs (e.g. for SPADs) 
by the railway industry. Our free clustering may sup-
port this as it provides a view that is more focused 
on potential spheres of activity. Such high-level 
view can help to find holistic strategies to improve 
human reliability in connection with SPADs. The 
presented approach is easy to understand and allows 
a user e.g. engineers a more systematic approach to 
the application of PSFs especially with regard to 
overlapping effects of different PSFs. 
 
The set of identified major PSFs for the train 
driver during SPADs should be investigated in fu-
ture studies. Especially the laboratory environment 
of a train simulator offers unique possibilities for a 
variety of research. Safety impairing influences of 
negative PSF’s under safe and controllable condi-
tions can be systematically analyzed under realistic 
conditions. For example, irregular and uncommon 
situations in regular railway operation can be intro-
duced to train drivers, in order to comprehend their 
problem solving strategies and to evaluate the resili-
ence of the human-machine interaction in railway 
operation. 
Finally, simulator studies can help to study in 
depth presumable dependencies of PSFs. This may 
be useful e.g. in order to validate CAHR interde-
pendency results and to answers the question about 
the correlations between primary and secondary 
PSFs or the groups of PSFs related to the different 
parts of the railway system. Such investigation may 
also serve to provide a quantitative extension of the 
classification approaches. It will also be possible to 
relate to a variety of psychological concepts that can 
serve as an explanatory framework for SPADs at a 
deeper level. Situation awareness and vigilance are 
promising concepts that could be used to explain the 
influence that negative PSF’s either have or do not 
have on attention. 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
The CAHR and WBA evaluations presented in this 
paper were conducted in the project “SMSmod” 
funded by the German Research Association (DFG). 
 
REFERENCES 
Boring, R.L., C.D. Griffith, and J.C. Joe (2007)  The Measure 
of Human Error: Direct and Indirect Performance Shaping 
Factors, in: joint 8th IEEE Conference on Human Factors 
and Power Plants / 13th Conference on Human Perfor-
mance, Root Cause and Trending (IEEE HFPP & HPRCT). 
2007, Idaho National Laboratory. 
Bortz, J. (2005)  Statistik für Human- und Sozialwissenschaft-
ler. 6. Auflage, Springer. 
Hammerl, M. (2011)  Analyse der menschlichen Einflussfakto-
ren und Zuverlässigkeit im Eisenbahnverkehr. Phd thesis, 
Technische Universität Braunschweig. 
Kyriakidis, M. et al. (2012) The development and assessment 
of a performance shaping factors taxonomy for railway op-
erations. In: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, 
Vol. 2289 (2012), 145-153. 
Ladkin, P. B. (2001)  Causal System Analysis. RVS-Bk-05-01. 
Bielefeld: University of Bielefeld, RVS Group. 
Schwencke, D., Talg, M. & Lemmer, K. (2012)  Bewertung des 
Einflusses von Performance Shaping Factors auf menschli-
che Handlungen im Bahnbetrieb. In Proc. 
Frühjahrskongess 2012 der Gesellschaft für 
Arbeitswissenschaften Kassel. 
Sträter, O. (2000)  Evaluation of Human Reliability on the Ba-
sis of Operational Experience. GRS-170. Köln: 
Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit. 
VDI 4006 (1999)  Menschliche Zuverlässigkeit – Teil 1: Ergo-
nomische Forderungen und Methoden der Bewertung – Teil 
2: Methoden zur quantitativen Bewertung menschlicher Zu-
verlässigkeit. Beuth-Verlag. Berlin. 
 
